By Simon Noriega-Olmos
This publication reconstructs the speculation of signification implicit in Aristotle's De Interpretatione and its mental heritage in hisDe Anima. The examine develops in 3 steps that correspond to the 3 parts considering each idea of signification: (1) the phonetic aspect or significans, referred to as mobile by way of Aristotle, (2) the significatum, i. e. what the phonetic fabric stands for, and (3) the relation among significans and significatum. This paintings breaks new floor via connecting the linguistic and mental points of Aristotle's concept of signification.
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Additional resources for Aristotle's Psychology of Signification: A Commentary on De Interpretatione 16ª 3–18
It is proper and distinctive of human beings not only insofar as humans are endowed with intellection (b d³ kºcor 1p· t` dgkoOm 1sti t¹ sulv´qom ja· t¹ bkabeqºm, ¦ste ja· t¹ d¸jaiom ja· t¹ %dijom, Pol. 1253a14 – 15) but also insofar as this particular form of cognition of the good, shameful, just, and unjust is a public or social property (B d³ to¼tym joimym¸a poie? oQj¸am ja· pºkim, Pol. 1253a18). That is to say, an abstract notion of what is just and unjust that humans share, i. e. a "pk_r notion of what is just, unjust, good or shameful that humans share.
Sight discerns white color, taste discerns bitter flavour, etc. See De an. 428b8 – 12. 66 “Strictly speaking the eyes or ears perceive only one object at a time, thus animals without phantasia would only get a sequence of incoherent imprints,” D. Frede (1995, 285). The former understanding of sense-perception is for D. Frede a good reason to believe that Aristotle must have concluded that all animals have phantasia. The idea behind D. Frede’s view seems to be that a hungry animal, for instance, only endowed with sense-perception would strive for food only as long as the food is present to it, for if something else catches its attention during the process of striving for food, the animal would completely forget about the food.
II, insofar as they are inserted within a study of sense-perception, whose scope has been set in book I, should be interpreted as a general treatment of vocalized sound applicable to all animals including human beings, a scope that coincides with the boundaries of the inquiry undertaken in Hist. an. IX, but is not coextensive with the more restricted scope of De int. where the concrete cases of vocalized sound under investigation, i. e. names, verbs, and assertive sentences as instruments for dialectic, are peculiar to human beings and must therefore stand for psychological events particular to human beings.